Aid on Spreadsheets

Arrested development: The dangerous mix of patronage and justice in post-conflict countries

Managing perpetrators of war crimes has been identified as a key challenge for peacebuilding in the wake of civil war. This project focuses on what happens to post-war societies at the moment leaders are arrested, which we suggest threaten former wartime leaders' patronage networks and may provoke a return to violence. We argue that violence is particularly likely to occur when incarcerated leaders have monopolized peacetime flows of patronage to their constituencies. In such situations, arrests are likely to leave clients in need, obliging them to leave the network. To salvage waning networks junior elites have incentives to organize armed attacks to compel the authorities to give them positions in the government or release the detained leader. The study will employ a mixed-method approach; a quantitative study of post-armed conflict arrests in the world (1946 to 2015) will be accompanied by a structured, focused comparison between the incarceration of Slobodan Milosevic (ex-Yugoslavia) and Charles Taylor (Liberia). By combining quantitative evidence with case analysis, this project will provide unique insights into the effect of the socioeconomic, political and military influence that wartime leaders often maintain even in post-conflict societies. The findings will advance scholarship and contribute to policy recommendation about how states can establish accountable and transparent rules and institutions that promote peace, security, and development.

Project ID

SE-0-29-2016-05734_3-251-43082

Activity status

2 - Implementation

Aid type

D02 - Other technical assistance

% to Liberia

100.00

Organisations

Funding

Sweden

Implementing

Uppsala universitet

Extending

None

CRS code	%
Research/scientific institutions (43082)	100.0